Bitcoin Mining as a Contest
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5195/ledger.2017.96Keywords:
Bitcoin mining, Game Theory, Nash EquilibriumAbstract
This paper presents a simple game theoretic framework, assuming complete information, to model Bitcoin mining activity. It does so by formalizing the activity as an all-pay contest: a competition where participants contend with each other to win a prize by investing in computational power, and victory is probabilistic. With at least two active miners, the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game suggests the following interesting insights on the motivation for being a miner: while the optimal amount of energy consumption depends also on the reward for solving the puzzle, as long as the reward is positive the decision to be an active miner depends only on the mining costs. Moreover, the intrinsic structure of the mining activity seems to prevent the formation of a monopoly, because in an equilibrium with two miners, both of them will have positive expected profits for any level of the opponent’s costs. A monopoly could only form if the rate of return on investment were higher outside bitcoin.
References
Nakamoto, S. “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System.” No Publisher (2008) https://bitcoin.com/bitcoin.pdf
Bonneau, J., Miller, A., Clark, J., Narayanan, A., Kroll, J., Felten, W. “SoK: Research Perspectives and Challenges for Bitcoin and Cryptocurrencies.” IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (2015) https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2015.14
Narayanan, A., Bonneau, J., Felten, E., Miller, A., Goldfeder, S. Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies. Princeton: Princeton University Press (2016)
Antonopoulos, A. Mastering Bitcoin, 2nd ed., Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly (2017)
Evans, D. “Economic Aspects of Bitcoin and Other Decentralized Public-Ledger Currency Platforms.” Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper 685 (2014) https://ssrn.com/abstract=2424516
Böhm, R., Christin, N., Edelman, B., Moore, T. “Bitcoin: Economics, Technology, and Governance.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 29 213-238 (2015) https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.29.2.213
Athey, S., Parashkevov I., Sarukkai, V., Xia, J. “Bitcoin Pricing, Adoption, and Usage: Theory and Evidence.” Stanford Business School Working Papers 3469 (2016) https://ssrn.com/abstract=2826674
Garratt, R., Wallace, N. “Bitcoin 1, Bitcoin 2, ... : An experiment in privately issued outside monies.” Working Paper, Department of Economics University of Santa Barbara (2016) https://escholarship.org/uc/item/91c7x1js
Rizun, P. “A Transaction Fee Market Exists Without a Block Size Limit.” Block Size Limit Debate Working Paper (2015) https://www.bitcoinunlimited.info/resources/feemarket.pdf
Houy, N. “The Bitcoin mining game.” Ledger 1 53-68 (2016) https://doi.org/10.5195/ledger.2016.13
Konrad, K. Strategy and Dynamics in Contests. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009)
Vojonovic, M. Contest Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2015)
Downloads
Additional Files
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Authors who publish with this journal agree to the following terms:
- The Author retains copyright in the Work, where the term “Work” shall include all digital objects that may result in subsequent electronic publication or distribution.
- Upon acceptance of the Work, the author shall grant to the Publisher the right of first publication of the Work.
- The Author shall grant to the Publisher and its agents the nonexclusive perpetual right and license to publish, archive, and make accessible the Work in whole or in part in all forms of media now or hereafter known under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License or its equivalent, which, for the avoidance of doubt, allows others to copy, distribute, and transmit the Work under the following conditions:
- Attribution—other users must attribute the Work in the manner specified by the author as indicated on the journal Web site;
- The Author is able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the nonexclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the Work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), as long as there is provided in the document an acknowledgement of its initial publication in this journal.
- Authors are permitted and encouraged to post online a prepublication manuscript (but not the Publisher’s final formatted PDF version of the Work) in institutional repositories or on their Websites prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work. Any such posting made before acceptance and publication of the Work shall be updated upon publication to include a reference to the Publisher-assigned DOI (Digital Object Identifier) and a link to the online abstract for the final published Work in the Journal.
- Upon Publisher’s request, the Author agrees to furnish promptly to Publisher, at the Author’s own expense, written evidence of the permissions, licenses, and consents for use of third-party material included within the Work, except as determined by Publisher to be covered by the principles of Fair Use.
- The Author represents and warrants that:
- the Work is the Author’s original work;
- the Author has not transferred, and will not transfer, exclusive rights in the Work to any third party;
- the Work is not pending review or under consideration by another publisher;
- the Work has not previously been published;
- the Work contains no misrepresentation or infringement of the Work or property of other authors or third parties; and
- the Work contains no libel, invasion of privacy, or other unlawful matter.
- The Author agrees to indemnify and hold Publisher harmless from Author’s breach of the representations and warranties contained in Paragraph 6 above, as well as any claim or proceeding relating to Publisher’s use and publication of any content contained in the Work, including third-party content.
- The Author agrees to digitally sign the Publisher’s final formatted PDF version of the Work.
Revised 7/16/2018. Revision Description: Removed outdated link.